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COMMENTS
TAX ASPECTS OF EMBEZZLEMENT
For persons looking for a so-called loophole in our tax law enforcement
one of the last remaining frontiers appears to be embezzlement within
the jurisdiction of the second judicial circuit of the federal court system.'
The second circuit has continued to follow a 1946 Supreme Court decision
in Commissioner v. Wilcox 2 which recites the interesting doctrine that
proceeds of embezzlement are not taxable income to the embezzler. In
spite of respectable authority that the doctrine is no longer the law of
the land the second circuit continues to hold out an invitation to the
would be embezzler.
History
A 1919 court of appeals decision held "Money so received [embezzled]
would not be subject to income taxation."' This principle, however, has
never been regarded as extending an exemption to illegal gains generally
and the courts have upheld the taxation of illegally derived funds involving
bootlegging profits, 4 bribes, 5 extortion money,6 illegal commissions, 7 illegal
contract profits,8 illicit bonuses, kickbacks, 10 ransom, 1 ultra vires stock
issues' 2 and usurious interest. 13 Thus the right of taxation of unlawful
or illegally derived funds has seldom if ever been questioned. 14 As Mr.
I. New York, Vermont and Connecticut.
2. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
3. Rau v. United States, 260 F. 131 (2d Cir. 1919).
4. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir. 1926).
5. Chadick v. United States, 77 F. 2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935).
6. Estate of Joseph Nitto, 13 T.C. 858 (1949).
7. Moore v. Thomas, 131 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1942).
8. Commonwealth Investment Co., 44 B.T.A. 445 (1941).
9. National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938); Griffin v.
Smith, 101 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1938).
10. Caldwell v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1943); Estate of Helene
Simmons, 26 T.C. 409 (1956).
11. Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942) cert. den. 317
U.S, (1942).
12. Penn v. Robertson, 29 F. Supp. 386 (M.D. N.C. 1939).
13. Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1938); Barker v. United States, 26 F.
Supp. 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1939). Barker is the same party in each case. In Barker v. Magruder
he was seeking a refund for the years 1926 and 1927, in Barker v. United States he is
fighting assessment of a deficiency for 1928 and 1929. See also Edgar B. Terrell, 7 B.T.A.
773 (1927).
14. See Annot. 43 A.L.R. 799 (1926) and supplementary Annot, 51 A.L.R. 1026
(1927). See also IREY & SLOCUM, THE TAx DoDcirs (1948), an interesting and
colorful story of taxing and convicting the top bracket illegal income group, including
Al Capone and Moses Annenberg. There is no indication that these parties ever
questioned the right to tax their illegal income.
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Justice Holnes casually commented in 1923, "of course congress may tax
what it also forbids."'"
The Wilcox Loophole
In 1946 tile Supreme Court adopted the early treatment of embezzled
funds on the ground that the embezzler did not hold under claim of right:
To be taxable, a gain must be conditioned on the presence of a
"bona fide legal or equitable" claim of right to the alleged gain,
and the absence of an unconditional obligation to repay.' 0
The impact of the decision upon legal scholars was considerable;' 7
however non-legal periodicals gave little attention to the holding.' 8 The
claim of right theory advanced by the court in Wilcox was not new. In
some earlier cases the courts had held that the recipient of illegally derived
funds had a claim of right,' 9 hence taxable income. Nevertheless, in other
cases where the wrongdoer was held to have no claim of right and a clear
legal obligation to repay his victim the courts held the funds to be taxable
income.Y' Mr. Justice Burton in his dissenting opinion in Wilcox emphasized
the artificial distinction upon which the majority opinion was based:
The embezzlers complete possession of the embezzled funds is
exercise of dominion over them to the extent of disposing of
every cent of them, amounts to such an ample enjoyment of
them . . . as to make them and his transfer of possession of them
to others in such a manner as to give the recipients title to them
. .. as to make them of obvious economic value to the embezzler.
Such a readily realizable value presents no reasonable basis for
exempting these funds from taxation that would be applied to
them if earned in a lawful manner.
2 '
15. U.S. v. Stafford, 260 U.S. 477 (1923) (involving taxation of bootlegging
profits).
16. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
17. Geller & Rogers, Embezzlement Has Its Tax Problems Tooi 26 TAxxs 1097
1948); Taxing Unsettled. Income: The "'Claim of Right" Test, 58 YALE L.J. 955 at
61 (1949); Notes, 62 LI. 662 (1953), 46 COLUM. L. Rex. 677 (1947), 25 Tex. L. Rev.
693 (1947), 26 B.U.L. Rev. 404 (1946); See also Annot. 166 A.L.R. 884 (1947).
18. WALL STREET JoURNAL, Feb. 26, 1946, p. 9, Cols. 5 & 6, The Journal carried
portions of the majority and dissenting opinions without editorial comment; N. Y.
SSis, Feb. 26, 1946, p. 45 Gol. 4, The Times carried the item on the next to the last
page in extra fine print listing only the style of the case, the decision and the "justices
filing opinions. Perhaps the decision was not entirely overlooked on Madison Avenise.
The following day the Times carried on its last page an advertisement for an article
by Wesley Price on "How to Rob a Bank." The item opencd with a statement in large
type "There Are 210 Ways to Embezzle." N.Y. "'iiMis, Feb. 27, 1946 p. 44 Cols.
4. 5.6. & 7.
19. Caldwell v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1943) (Kickback); Moore
v. Thomas, 131 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1942) (Illegal commission); National City Bank
v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (Zd Cir. 1938) (Illicit bonus); Penn v. Robertson, 29 F.
Supp. 386 (M.D. N.C. 1939) (Ultra vires stock issuc);.Barker v. United States, 26 F,
Supp. 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1938) (Usury).
20. Humphreys v. Cornmissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942) (Rinsom);
Criffin v. Smith, 101 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1938) (Illicit bonus); Barker v. Magruder,
95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (Usury); Chadick v. Uiiited States. 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir,
1935) (Bribe).
21. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946) (Dissenting opinion).
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Immediately following the court's decision in Wilcox the country was
overrun with would be embezzlers who upon assessment of tax deficiencies
temerariously advised the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that no
tax was due on their "embezzled" gains. 22 A speedy lady "embezzler"
successfully raised the embezzlement defense within a week of the Wilcox
decision,23 but generally the courts refused to hear such a defense and
have held the ill gotten gains taxable. 24 In cases nearer genuine embezzle-
ment the courts found the taxpayer to be a swindler25 or a converter"
rather than an embezzler thereby avoiding the so-called Wilcox defense.
The Rutkin Decision
In 1952 the Court decided that money obtained by extortion is
income taxable to the extortioner.27 The majority opinion was written by
Mr. Justice Burton, the lone dissenter in Wilcox. A strong dissent by
Mr. Justice Black28 referred to the claim of right theory set forth in
Wilcox and declared, "I just do not think Congress intended to treat the
plunder of such criminals as theirs."29 The intent of Congress is stated
perhaps, more clearly and less emotionally in Mr. Justice Burton's dissent
in Wilcox.30 As pointed out by Geller and Rogers:
... Mr. Justice Burton calls attention to an important change made
by the Revenue Act of 1916. The Act of 1913 originally provided
that "the net income of a taxable person shall include gains,
profits, and income from ... the transaction of any lawful business
carried on for gain or profit. [emphasis added] The 1916 Act
omitted the word "lawful."
31
The Rutkin decision3 2 was hailed by a few judges and writers as overruling
Wilcox;3a however some diehard embezzlers continued to fight for their
22. Schira v. Commissioner, 240 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Wyss, 239 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1957); Drybough v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 735 (6th
Cir. 1956); Davis v. United States, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955); United States v.
Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Currier Lumber Co. 70 F. Supp.
219(D. Mass. 1947); Estate of Helene Simmons, 26 T.C. 409 (1956); Henry C. Boucher,
18 TC. 710 (1952); Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C. 1253 (1948); Agnes McCue, P-1l
1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. 46,059; 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 349 (1953).
23. Agnes McCue, P-H 1946 T.C. Mer. Dec. 46,059; 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mer.
349 (1953). Decided March 4, 1946. The Wilcox decision was handed down on
Feb. 5, 1946.
24. See note 21 supra.
25. Rollinger v. United States, 208 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1953); Akers v. Scofield, 167
F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. den., 335 U.S. 823 (1948).
26. Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954), rehearing dell., cert.
den., 348 U.S. 865 (1954). .%
27. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
28. joined by Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas.
29. See note 26, supra, dissenting opinion.
30. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
31. Geller & Rogers, Embezzlement Has Its Tax Problems Too, 26 TAXES 1097
(1948 .34. See note 26 supra.
33. "It is difficult to perceive what, if anything is left of the Wilcox holding
after Rutkin . . ." United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955) at,61;
Notes, 7 MIAMI L .Q. 256 (1953); 62 YALE L. J. 662 (1953).
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Wilcox rights. The majority of cases since Rutkin involve apparently
genuine embezzlements by taxpayers who wholly own or control close
corporations. 34 Generally the courts have refused the Wilcox defense
here as they did in other illegal income cases. 35 A conflict of decisions
between the sixth and second circuits 6 gave the Supreme Court an
opportunity to clarify the issue but the Court declined. 7 The factual
situation of the embezzlement in the second circuit case was well within
the fact pattern of similar cases decided against embezzlers and would be
embezzlers subsequent to the Rutkin case.38
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in the face of the conflicting
contemporaneous decisions of the sixth and second circuits leaves the
tax consequences of embezzled funds more muddled than ever. The
Court's action suggests that it will leave to Congress a specific affirmation
of the views set forth in either the Wilcox or Rutkin cases.
Proposed Solution
It is suggested that embezzlement is like other crimes and should not
receive preferential treatment for tax purposes on the basis of such
technical niceties as the legal concept of when title passes. "[Tjaxation is
not so much concerned with the refinements of title, as it is with the
actual command over the property taxed ... ,
Further:
Tax liability is an economic not a moral question. No prostitute,
narcotics peddler, or anyone else can escape the payment of income
tax on moral grounds. No more should an embezzler, a thief, a
robber, a burglar, or any other criminal be permitted to go tax
free . . . upon the moral or legal basis that the money which
he acquired was not technically his own but his victims as against
34. Dawkins v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 174 (8th Cir. 1956) (Husband held
3%, wife 95%, two children, each 1%,); Drybough v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 735
(6th Cir. 1956) (Two persons owned or controlled 100%); Davis v. United States, 226
F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. den. 350 U.S. 965, rehearing den., 351 U.S. 915 (1956)
(wholly owned); Dix v. Commissioner 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. den., 350
U.S. 894 (1955) (wholly owned); Kaun v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1954)
(Kann family owned or controlled 90%), cert. den., 347 U.S. (1954); United States v.
Currier Lnber Co. inc., 70 F. Stpp. 219 (D. Mass 1947) (husband held 75%,
wife 25%).
35. See note 21 supra.
36. Dix v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955) and Davis v. United States,
226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955).
37. Commissioner v. Dix, 350 U.S. 894 (1955) cert. den. and Davis v. United States,
350 U.S. 965 (1956), cert. den., 351 U.S. 951, rehearing den.
38. Dix v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1955) (Dissenting opinion of
Judge ltincks, ". . . I think the facts here are stronger than in 'Wilcox and come
within the rationale of the Rutkin case. Cf. Kann v. Commissioner . . .Marienfeld
v. United States ..."
39. Mr. Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
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the economic reality of funds having been taken by him with
intent to appropriate and enjoy them as his own .... 40
It is offered that the collection of taxes should be a purely administrative
function. It is not for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to sit as a
summary court for the determination of innocence or guilt of taxpayers
in collateral matters. Rather it should be his job to assess taxes on the
basis of money coining into the hands of taxpayers from whatever source
derived and to allow subsequent adjustments in such tax liabilities as
allowed by law. Finally it is deemed outrageous that a criminal or would-be
criminal should be accorded an advantage in tax consequences over an
honest taxpayer simply because he may be guilty of a crime and the honest
taxpayer is not. A legislative directive, drafted to include embezzlement
proceeds, is in order.
41
A. Jay Cristol
40. Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1954), rehearing den., cert.
den., 348 U.S. 865 (1954). Quoted from the excellent special concurring opinion of
Judge Johnson. It appears to this writer that the district court found as a matter
of fact that the defendant was a converter rather than an embezzler. United States
v. Marienfeld, 116 F. Supp. 634 (E. D. Mo. 1953). As a result the defense of em-
bezzlement was not maintainable. Mr. Justice Black was of the opinion that certiorari
should have been granted. 348 U.S. 865 (1954). See also Briggs v. U.S., 77 F.2d
699 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. den., 348 U.S. 864 (1954).
41. It is suggested that the lr. REv. ConE of 1954 be amended in the following
fashion.
To § 61 Gross Income Defined.
(a) General Definition-Except os otherwise provided in this sub-
title, gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
including (but not limited to) the following items . . . Add the fol-
lowing.
(16) Any funds or benefits exclusive of gifts which are received
or taken with intent to appropriate or enjoy such funds or benefits
in the manner of an owner and upon which there is no actual or
express promise or obligation to the owner or possessor of repayment.
To § 1341 Computation of tax where taxpayer restores substantial amount
held under claim of right.
a) General Rule. -1-
1) An item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year
or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted
right to such item; (2) . . . Add the following
(c) Special Presumption.
Any item which was included in gross income under (a) (1) of
this section shall be treated as if held under claim of right in regard
to the allowance of computations and adjustments provided by this
section.
